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In this paper we analyse the monetary impact of alternative ﬁscal
policy rules using the debt and deﬁcit, both mentioned as measures of
ﬁscal policy performance in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). We
use a New Keynesian model, with distortionary taxation and an appro-
priately deﬁned output gap. The economy is hit by two fundamental
shocks: demand and supply shocks, which are orthogonal to each other.
Monetary policy is conducted by an independent central bank that will
optimise. Under discretionary monetary policy the size of the inﬂation
bias depends on the ﬁscal policy regime. Using the timeless perspective
approach to precommitment, output persistence increases compared to
the discretionary case. The result holds with the alternative ﬁscal policy
rules, and inﬂation and output persistence reﬂects the economic data.
With the deﬁcit rules, the autocorrelation of the tax rate is near unity
irrespective of the monetary policy regime, and irrespective of the ﬁscal
policy parameters and targets. Thus we revive Barro’s (1979) random
walk result with the deﬁcit rules.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In huge part of the optimal monetary policy literature ﬁscal policy is simple
or even not modelled at all. The literature on monetary policy has focused
on how the monetary policy can stabilise the economy under shocks, mainly
technology shocks. Benhabib and Wen (2004) claim that an aggregate demand
shock is able to explain the actual ﬂuctuation in RBC models. From a Keyne-
sian point of view, demand shocks are thought to be important for generating
business cycles because the slow adjustment in prices may cause resources to
be under-utilised, making possible the expansion of output without increases
in marginal costs in response to higher aggregate demand.
The description of more detailed ﬁscal and monetary policy was reintro-
duced by Sargent and Wallace (1981) in their unpleasant monetaristic arith-
metics. The government has access to a subsidy to factor inputs ﬁnanced with
lump-sum taxes aimed at dismantling the ineﬃciency introduced by imperfect
competition in product markets. As follows there is an fast-growing literature
on optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy, where the behaviour of both policy-
makers is based on optimisation, and therefore the ﬁscal authority aﬀects the
price level determination1.
In this paper we analyse the monetary impact of alternative ﬁscal policy
rules with both demand and supply shocks. We do this in a New Keynesian
model, with distortionary taxation and sticky prices. We derive endogenous
potential output to react to ﬁscal policy variables and hence, ﬁscal policy has
not only demand but supply side eﬀects. Benigno and Woodford (2004a and
2004b) consider the appropriate stabilisation objectives in a model where the
output target is deﬁned to respond to real disturbances and therefore, the
output gap is relevant to the policy authority.
Monetary policy is conducted by an independent central bank that will
optimise, but the ﬁscal authority has to follow a rule. The society delegates
monetary policy to an independent and conservative central bank that shares
the welfare function of the society but puts more emphasis on inﬂation than
the society does2. By independence we mean that the central bank has full
control over the monetary policy instruments and chooses how much public
debt is monetised. However, as shown in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004b),
with even a small degree of price stickiness optimal inﬂation volatility is close
to zero. We do not base the ﬁscal policy behaviour on optimisation, since we
are more interested in diﬀerent ﬁscal policy regimes.
1Eg see Chari and Kehoe (1999), Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991 and 1994), Benigno
and Woodford (2003) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003, 2004a and 2004b), Siu (2004).
2See eg Barro-Gordon (1983), Rogoﬀ (1985) and Svensson (1997).
2We formulate alternative ﬁscal policy rules using the debt and the deﬁcit,
b o t hm e n t i o n e da sm e a s u r e so fﬁscal policy performance in the Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP). As the output gap reacts to both demand and supply,
this opens another determination channel of the inﬂa t i o nb i a s ,s i n c ea si nS i u
(2004) the ﬁscal policy tries to balance a spending shock by absorbing inﬂation
beneﬁts. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003, 2004a and 2004b) ﬁnd that ﬁscal
policy in a model with distortionary taxation aﬀects the determination of
steady state inﬂation and inﬂation volatility.
Siu (2004) states that an important result of the optimal policy literature
is the prescription of policies that smooth tax distortions over time and across
states of nature. When governments ﬁnance stochastic government spending
by taxing labour income and issuing one-period debt, state-contingent returns
on that debt allow tax rates to be roughly constant, as in Lucas and Stokey
(1983) and also Chari et al (1991 and 1994). In contrast to Barro’s (1979)
random walk result, Chari et al show that with ﬂexible prices these variables
inherit the serial correlation of the model’s underlying shocks.
Siu (2004) ﬁnds that the serial correlation properties of optimal tax rates
and real government debt diﬀer in ﬂexible and sticky price models. Siu also
ﬁnds that with sticky prices the autocorrelations of these objects are near
unity regardless of the persistence in the shock process, thus partially reviving
Barro’s (1979) random walk result. The ﬁnding is similar to Aiyagari et al
(2002), who consider optimal policy in a model with incomplete markets.
We show that under discretionary monetary policy, the size of inﬂation
bias depends on the ﬁscal policy regime when ﬁscal policy follows a rule. If
the central bank is able to commit, inﬂation bias disappears. More impor-
tantly, under the timeless perspective of monetary policy precommitment by
Woodford (1999), output persistence increases signiﬁcantly compared to the
discretionary case. We also revive Barro’s (1979) random walk result with the
deﬁcit rules for both under commitment and discretionary monetary policy
irrespective of the ﬁscal policy regime. With the debt rules the Barro result
does not hold for the high debt to GDP target values, and the tax rate inherits
the stochastic nature of underlying shocks.
The paper is organised as follows. Chapter 2 describes the economy: the
behaviour of the household and the ﬁrm. It sets up the policy target for
both the central bank and the ﬁscal authority. In Chapter 3 we set up our
simulation procedure and introduce all the results. Chapter 4 concludes the
discussion.
32 The Model
We consider a production economy with continum of identical ﬁrms, an inﬁ-
nitely lived representative consumer and a public sector. There is a composite
consumption good ct and a public good gt that satisfy the resource constraint
yt = ct + gt, (1)
where yt is the aggregate production. The available production technology is
represented as a constant returns to scale production function
yt = Alt, (2)
where lt is labour input and A = ζteα∗Time denotes technological progress.
Stochastic ﬂuctuations around a deterministic trend in the log of productivity
zt ≡ lnζt are given by an exogenous AR(1) process










δtu(ct,m t,l t;gt) (4)
subject to the budget constraint
ct + mt − (1 − πt)mt−1 + bt ≤ (1 + rt−1)bt−1 + wtlt(1 − τt)+Πt, (5)
where mt is real money balances, bt is government bonds held by the household
in real terms, wt is the real gross wage rate, τt is the tax rate and Πt is the real
proﬁtf r o mt h eﬁrms the household owns3. The household’s discount factor
is δ and Et is the expectation operator conditional on information available
in period t. We assume that the utility function u(ct,m t,l t;gt) is continuous,
increasing and concave.
The ﬁrst order conditions are
uc (ct,m t,l t;gt) − ξt =0 , (6)
um (ct,m t,l t;gt) − ξt + δEt
£
ξt+1 (1 − πt+1)
¤
=0 , (7)
3Inﬂation π is deﬁned as
Pt−Pt−1
Pt = πt, which implies that 1 − πt =
Pt−1
Pt . The nominal
interest rate Rt is 1+Rt =( 1+rt)/(1 − πt+1),w h e r ert is the real interest rate and πt+1
is the ex post expected inﬂation rate .
4ul (ct,m t,l t;gt)+ξtwt(1 − τt)=0 , (8)
ξt = δEtξt+1 (1 + rt), (9)
where ξ is the Lagrangean multiplier and subscripts note partial derivatives.
Combining equations, the ﬁrst order conditions yield
Et
∙
uc (ct+1,m t+1,l t+1;gt+1)










ul (ct,m t,l t;gt)=−uc (ct,m t,l t;gt)wt(1 − τt). (12)










1+λ + f (gt),w h e r eσ ≥ 0 is the elasticity
of the intertemporal substitution of consumption and Γ is a positive constant.
λ ≥ 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of the labour supply. Using the
periodical utility function, the ﬁrst order conditions can be rewritten as
c−σ
t = Etc−σ









t wt(1 − τt). (15)
Combining (13) and (14) with the resource constraint yields4
lnyt = Et lnyt+1 +
g
y
























A representative proﬁt maximising ﬁrm hires labour, and produces and
sells products in a monopolistically competitive goods market5.T h e ﬁrm
4First we loglinearise the equations (13) and (14) and following Uhlig (1999). Log-




ye gt. Since we want to write IS
and LM in (log) levels, we apply the deﬁnition of the logarithmic deviations, eg for output





, and the steady state conditions. See Railavo (2003) for details.
5We assume that the labour market is perfectly competitive.
5produces goods using labour lt. We can write the real marginal cost of the
















¢λ (1 − τt)−1 into the marginal
cost equation to yield
cσ
t yλ
t A−(1+λ)(1 − τt)−1 = mct. (19)
Taking natural logarithms of (19) and using the deﬁnition of technological
development A = ζteα∗Time yields
λlnyt − (1 + λ)lnζt − (1 + λ)α ∗ Time+ σ lnct − ln(1 − τt)=l nmct. (20)
In a ﬂexible price equilibrium the nominal price equals the mark-up times




















t is the level of ﬂexible price output with a distortionary tax rate, and










To ﬁnd the pricing equation of the ﬁrm, we follow Rotemberg (1987).
We assume that there exists costs to the ﬁrm when it changes prices. This
assumption will introduce price stickiness and reﬂect the empirical aspect that
individual price setting is lumpy. The forward-looking ﬁrm sets prices by















where β = 1
(1+r),r > 0 is the discount factor and a is an adjustment cost
parameter. By taking the ﬁrst order conditions of (22), rearranging terms and
using the supply function (21), the New Keynesian Phillips curve yields







6In real terms mct =
1
µ,w h e r eµ is the mark-up. See Railavo (2003) for detailed derivation
of equation (21).
7Combine (20) with the log-linearised resource contraint. Using the steady state conditon
of (20) we can again convert the loglinearised equation into a (log) levels form.
8Note that zt ≡ lnζt.
6Public sector behaviour is characterised by a budget constraint, an expen-
diture path, a monetary policy delegated to a central bank and a ﬁscal policy
rule. The intertemporal budget constraint for the policy authority links debt
and policy choices. The real ﬂow budget constraint can be written as
bt + τtyt + πtmt−1 + mt − mt−1 =( 1+rt−1)bt−1 + gt, (24)
where bt is the government bonds, τtyt is the tax revenue, mt is the nominal
money balances, rt is the real interest rate and gt is the public spending. The
policy authority balances its budget with new debt, with taxes and seignior-
age revenue (πtmt−1 + mt − mt−1). The intertemporal government budget
constraint, which sums up the expected budget surpluses, is given by





(πt+imt−1+i + mt+i − mt−1+i (25)
+τt+iyt+i − gt+i).





+( 1− ρg)γ + ε
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where γ is a constant public consumption to GDP ratio. Innovations σ2
ν and
σ2
εg of fundamental shocks are orthogonal to each other.
Monetary policy is delegated to an independent central bank following
Rogoﬀ (1985). Optimal monetary policy is based on minimising a loss function
common to the central bank and society. The welfare loss of the central bank




















where π∗ is the inﬂation target, χ is the positive parameter that reﬂects the









t is the desired level of potential output for the central bank
(see Appendix A). The central bank targets the eﬃcient level of output in
7the absence of the monopolistic distortion. Also the non distorted ﬂexible
price output does not depend on the households’ labour supply decisions.
Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) have shown that the loss measure can be
derived by approximating the expected utility of a representative household
when χ>0. As mentioned in Aoki and Nikolov (2003), the analysis is valid
for arbitrary values of χ.
In discretionary case the central bank minimises the discounted losses sub-
ject to the Phillips curve (23). Substituting the Phillips curve into the central























Under discretion, once expectations about future inﬂation Etπt+1 are formed,
the central bank optimises taking them as given. Hence, we get a sequence of
static minimisation problems, see eg Cukierman (1992, Chapter 3). Optimal
monetary policy under discretion is












As a result, a central bank that emphasises output at all, creates an inﬂa-
tionary bias to the economy. Cukierman (1992 ) recalls the point made by
Barro and Gordon (1983): under discretion the inﬂationary bias of the mone-
tary policy carries over to the case in which the central bank cares about the
future as well as about the present. Also the output gap is replaced by the




κ ln(1 − τt).










ln(1 − τt). (31)
Under commitment the central bank does not take expectations about
future inﬂation as given. Then the central bank’s objective is to pick πt+i,
9Under discretion, once the expectation about the future inﬂation Etπt+1 is formed, the
central bank reoptimise taking them as given. Hence, we can treat the mimimisation problem
in isolation for period t. See Chapter 3 in Cukierman(1992).
10The output gap is the diﬀerence between actula and potential output, lnyt − lny
f
t .
























lnyt+i − lnyt+i+1 +
c
y


















where θt+i and ϕt+i are Lagrangian multipliers. The ﬁrst order conditions are
Et
£
















σ−1Et (θt+i)=0 . (35)
From (35) we obtain that Et (θt+i)=0for all i>0. As mentioned in Walsh
(2003), this reﬂects the fact that the equation (16) imposes no real constraint
on the central bank as long as there are no restrictions on varying the nominal
interest rate. By substituting the ﬁrst order conditions (33) and (34) into the















Under commitment the central bank not only care about the future and
present as suggested by Barro and Gordon (1983), but also about the past.
Woodford (1999) calls such a policy optimal from a timeless perspective.
Woodford (2003, Chapter 7) states that a time-invariant policy is optimal
from a timeless perspective if the equilibrium evolution from any date t0 on-
ward is optimal, subject to the constraint that the economy’s initial evolution
be the one associated with the policy in question. Under a timeless perspective

































Combining equations (37) and (36), we have the optimal monetary policy











































+βEtπt+1 + πt−1 − a[ln(1 − τt) − ln(1 − τt−1)].
There appears the lagged inﬂation term in optimal policy equations (38) and
(39),w h i c hw i l lm a k et h ei n ﬂation more persistent under commitment. This
is due to the substitution of the output gap with the welfare gap.
Fiscal policy, following Leeper (1991), is represented as a debt rule
τt = τ∗ + φ[(bt−1 + mt−1)/yt − ψ1]. (40)
Here, τ∗ is a positive constant representing a long-run tax rate11, bt−1 +mt−1
are the real government liabilities, ψ>0 represents the debt to GDP ratio
target and φ is the ﬁscal policy parameter. The higher values φ gets, the
more weight the ﬁscal authority places on balancing the government budget.
Railavo (2003) has shown that this type of ﬁscal policy rule results in a stable
solution with Taylor rule type monetary policy if inﬂation response is more
than one-for-one with a wide range of positive ﬁscal policy rule parameter
values.
11τ
∗ is related to the long-run tax rate, since
bt−1+mt−1
yt need not be equal to zero.
10We also explore other ﬁscal policy rules. The government liabilities in the
ﬁscal policy rule (40) c a nb er e p l a c e db yt h eg o v e r n m e n tp r i m a r yd e ﬁcit, in
which case the ﬁscal policy rule is a deﬁcit rule of the form
τt = τ∗ + Ω[(gt − τtyt + Rtbt−1)/yt − ψ2], (41)
where the primary deﬁcit is gt−τtyt and the interest payment on the real debt
outstanding is Rtbt−1. This is the SGP deﬁnition of the deﬁcit and conforms
closely with the deﬁcit based on the real government budget constraint. See
Railavo (2004) for details.
An alternative to the Leeper (1991) way of writing a ﬁscal policy rule is to
use the diﬀerence of the tax rate. It resemblance an error-correction approach
and the tax rate movement is smoother as suggested in Barro (1979). An
error-correction debt rule can be written as follows
τt = τt−1 + φ[(bt−1 + mt−1) − ψ1yt]/yt. (42)
Railavo (2004) shows that (42) is highly unstable for a large range of pos-
itive parameter φ values when the monetary policy decribed by the Taylor
(1993) rules is active ie interest rate reactions are more than one-for-one to
inﬂation. Therefore we shall not study the eﬀects of shocks under (42) using
the stochastic simulation procedure described below. On the other hand, the
corresponding error-correction ﬁscal policy rule with the deﬁcit
τt = τt−1 + Ω[(gt − τtyt + Rtbt−1) − ψ2yt]/yt (43)
produces stable solutions for a wide range of ﬁscal policy parameter, Ω,v a l u e s
as shown in Railavo (2004), and, hence, will be used in simulations.
3 Stochastic simulation
We analyse the time-series properties of inﬂation, the interest rate, output,
the debt to GDP ratio and the tax rate as a response to the fundamental
stochastic shocks. The stochastic nature of exogenous variables is given by
(3) and (26). We also show the relationship with inﬂation, the interest rate,
the debt to GDP ratio and the tax rate in the steady state. Our simulation
procedure involves simulating the model given by equations (16), (17), (21),
(23), (24) and (49). Monetary policy is either discretionary (31) or follows
the commitment solution (38). Fiscal policy is conducted with diﬀerent policy
rules (40), (41) or (43). The initial and terminal values are set equal to the
steady state values of the model.
11σ λ a Γ δ β
0.157 1.433 0.003 0.7 0.97 0.97
π∗ τ∗ ζ χ
g
y
0.02 0.24 0.018 0.05 0.4
Table 1: The parameter values used and not altered in simulation
We solve the model 2500 times to obtain a set of time series, which are then
used to compute the variability and persistence statistics. In our procedure,
simulations are done in a recursive manner. In the ﬁrst round the model
is simulated for 2500 periods, in the second round 2499 periods, etc. In each










distributions, but for subsequent periods their values are set
for zero. We have set σ2
ν =0 .01 and σ2
εg i ss e tt ob eo n ep e r c e n to ft h eG D P .
Following Cooley and Prescott (1995), we have set ρ =0 .81,w h i c hr e ﬂects
that 95 percent of the technology shock remains after one quarter. Respec-
tively we set ρg =0 .975 according to Blanchard and Perotti (2002), which
means that 95 percent of the government spending shock still remains after
2 years. The model is calibrated to reﬂect the economic structure of a large
economy and the key parameter values of the model are given in Table 1.
Table 2 shows the steady state results with the debt rule (40) and discre-
tionary monetary policy (31). We let the ﬁscal policy rule parameter φ vary
from 0.1 to 1.5 and the debt to GDP ratio target ψ1 from a tight target (0) to
al o o s et a r g e t(1.5). As concluded in Railavo (2003 and 2004), the low values
of the ﬁscal policy rule parameter indicate active ﬁscal policy while the higher
values refer to passive policy. As deﬁned in Leeper (1991), the passive ﬁscal
policy authority must generate suﬃcient tax revenues to balance the budget
regardless of inﬂation, whereas the active authority is not constrained by bud-
getary conditions. Monetary policy is active wether it is conducted under
discretion or commitment. The steady state values of the tax rules (40) and
(41) depend on the values of the ﬁscal policy parameter φ and Ω, respectively,
and also on the values of the target, ψ1 and ψ2, respectively. However, the
steady state values of the tax rules (42) and (43) do not depend on the values
of the ﬁscal policy parameter φ and Ω, respectively, but only on the values of
the target, ψ1 and ψ2, respectively.
We can see from Table 2 that there is inﬂation bias with discretionary
monetary policy, as inﬂation is above the target value, π∗ =0 .02.W e a l s o
see that the size of the bias depends on the ﬁscal policy parameter, φ,v a l u e s
and the debt to GDP target, ψ1, values. Loosening the debt to GDP target
12φ 0.1 0.5 0.9 1.5


































































Table 2: Discretionary monetary policy with the debt rule
increases the steady state debt to GDP ratio and the steady state inﬂation
increases. The high tax rate is associated with the high debt to GDP ratios,
which feeds into inﬂation. The debt to GDP ratio decreases as the ﬁscal policy
parameter gets larger values, ie the ﬁscal policy authority reacts more with
the tax rate. The largest changes in the steady state values happen when the
ﬁscal policy parameter, φ, changes from 0.1 to 0.5. With higher values of φ,
the change in the steady state values of inﬂation, the tax rate and the interest
rate is small compared to the changes in the debt to GDP ratio. Also, with
the φ =0 .1, the change in the target parameter has the largest impact on the
steady state values of inﬂation and the tax rate. This indicates that there is
strong non-linearity with the low values of φ.
Table 3 shows the steady state ratios with the deﬁcit rule (41).N o w
the deﬁcit to GDP target ψ2 gets values between zero and 0.1 as the ﬁscal
policy rule parameter Ω runs from 0.1 to 1.5. Again, we see that increasing
the target makes the debt to GDP ratio increase, which has an impact on
inﬂation. We also see that the low values of the ﬁscal policy rule parameter
result in an extremely high debt to GDP ratio in the steady state. The high
debt levels are associated with the high tax rate and with the low ﬁscal policy
parameter value. Overall, the debt and deﬁcit rule results in similar steady
state responses to changes in the ﬁscal policy parameter and target values.
Table 4 shows the steady state values under the deﬁcit rule (43).N o wt h e
ﬁscal policy parameter Ω has an impact neither on the steady state tax rate
13Ω 0.1 0.5 0.9 1.5


































































Table 3: Discretionary monetary policy with the deﬁcit rule
nor on the steady state debt to GDP level. Increase in the deﬁcit target ψ2
increases the steady state debt to GDP ratio and inﬂation. However, changing
the deﬁc i tt a r g e th a sas m a l le ﬀect on the level of the steady state inﬂation
compared on the quite large impact to the debt to GDP ratio.
Tables 5 and 6 display the steady state values when the monetary policy
authority is able to commit. As expected, inﬂa t i o nw i l lb ea tt h et a r g e tl e v e l
for all combinations of the ﬁscal policy parameter and the target values. With
the debt rule (40), the debt to GDP ratio will increase as the ﬁscal policy
parameter φ value decreases and the debt to GDP target ψ1 value increases.
With the error-correction deﬁcit rule (43),t h eﬁscal policy parameter does
n o th a v ea ne ﬀect on the steady state debt to GDP ratios. However, the debt
to GDP ratio will increase as the deﬁcit target increases, which results in a
higher steady state tax rate.
Tables 7 to 11 display the variability and persistence statistics as a response
to the underlying fundamental stochastic shocks. We let the ﬁscal policy
parameters, φ and Ω, vary from 0.1 to 1.5 and the target parameter value
changes from low (tight) to higher values (looser).
Barro (1979) claims that an optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy problem
results in an optimal tax rate and debt will follow a random walk. Lucas
and Stokey (1983) and Chari et al (1991 and 1994) show that with ﬂexible
prices Barro’s result of an optimal tax rate to follow a random walk does
not hold. Chari et al (1991 and 1994) also claim that the tax rate and debt
14Ω 0.1 0.5 0.9 1.5


































































Table 4: Discretionary monetary policy with the error-correction deﬁcit rule
φ 0.1 0.5 0.9 1.5


































































Table 5: Committed monetary policy with the debt rule
15Ω 0.1 0.5 0.9 1.5


































































Table 6: Committed monetary policy with the error-correction deﬁcit rule
inherit the serial correlation of the model’s underlying shocks. Siu (2004)
found that in a sticky price model, especially in the case in which government
ﬁnances spending by increasing taxes, resulting in an accumulated debt, the
autocorrelations of the debt to GDP ratio and the tax rate are near unity
regardless of the persistence in the shock process, partially reviving Barro’s
random walk result.
In Table 7 we can see that the variability of inﬂation decreases as the
parameter φ in the debt rule (40) gets larger values, but the variability of
the tax rate increases. The variability of both inﬂation and the tax rate
increases as the debt to GDP ratio target, ψ1, gets larger values. Inﬂation
and the interest rate are highly autocorrelated for all the parameter values.
The persistence of the debt to GDP ratio and the tax rate decreases as both
or either the ﬁscal policy parameter and the debt to GDP ratio target get
larger values. With the low target values, ie the low steady state debt to GDP
ratio, the autocorrelation of the debt to GDP ratio and the tax rate are near
unity supporting Barro’s (1979) result. However, increasing the target values,
ie making the debt to GDP ratio less restrictive, reduces the autocorrelation
of the variables and supports the Chari et al (1991 and 1994) result even in a
sticky price model. Output variability and persistence remain quite constant
and low regardless of the changes in the parameter values.
Table 8 repeats the previous results now with the deﬁcit rule (41).T h e
overall results are similar to the previous results, but the persistence of the
16debt to GDP ratio and the tax rate do not decrease with the increase of the
values of the Ω and ψ2 parameters. Now we ﬁnd support for Barro (1979) and
Siu (2004) with all parameter value combinations. The change in ﬁscal policy
do not aﬀect the persistence of the tax rate. However, output persistence and
volatility do not improve due to results with the debt rule.
The introduction of the error-correction deﬁcit rule (43) does not change
the results signiﬁcantly compared with the deﬁcit rule (41), as can be seen in
Table 9. The persistence of inﬂation, the interest rate, the debt to GDP ratio
and the tax rate remains high. However, the variability of inﬂation decreases
with the low ﬁscal policy parameter Ω values compared with the results of
the deﬁcit rule. This is due to the fact that the ﬁscal policy parameter has
no impact on the debt to GDP ratio and hence on the level of inﬂation with
the error-correction deﬁcit rule. The variability of the debt to GDP ratio is
smaller when the debt to GDP ratio level is smaller.
In Table 10 we see the results with committed monetary policy (38) and
t h ed e b tr u l e(40). We can see that under the commitment of monetary
policy output persistence increases signiﬁcantly compared to the discretionary
case. This demonstrates the timeless perspective of monetary policy as optimal
monetary policy under commitment (39) displays a lagged inﬂation term. As
the persistence increases there is a considerable increase in the variability of
output. Whereas the variability of output increases under commitment, that
of inﬂation and the interest rate falls. The variability of the tax rate and
the debt to GDP ratio remain relatively similar with both discretionary and
committed monetary policy. However, the persistence of the two increases
somewhat, especially with the high ﬁscal policy and debt to GDP ratio target
values. Still, the autocorrelation of the two variables gives support to the
Barro ﬁnding when the target has low values. As the debt to GDP increases
and the ﬁscal policy reacts more with taxes, the autocorrelation drops and the
tax rate inherits the serial correlation of the shock as in Chari et al (1991 and
1994).
T h es a m er e s u l ts h o w su pw i t ht h ed e ﬁcit rule (43). The results inTable
11 are similar to the results of discretionary monetary policy with the deﬁcit
rule except for output. Like in the previous case, the volatility and persistence
of output has increased signiﬁcantly compared with the discretionary mone-
tary policy case. The autocorrelation of the debt to GDP ratio and the tax
rate will remain high, reﬂecting Barro’s results with all the ﬁscal parameter
combinations.
174C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we analysed the eﬀects of alternative ﬁscal policy rules with
optimal monetary policy. With discretionary monetary policy, inﬂation bias
depends on the ﬁscal policy with both the debt and deﬁcit rule. The ﬁscal
policy parameter and the target values, hence the ﬁscal policy regime, aﬀect
the size of the bias. The higher values the ﬁscal policy parameter and the target
parameter get the higher the steady state debt to GDP ratio is and inﬂation
becomes. The target parameter changes increase inﬂation more evenly, but
the policy parameter changes are more notable between low values than with
high values.
With the error-correction deﬁcit rule, the ﬁscal policy parameter has no
impact on the steady state tax rate and, also, on the steady state debt to GDP
level. A rise in the deﬁcit target increases the steady state debt to GDP ratio
and inﬂation. However, changing the deﬁcit target has a small eﬀect on the
level of the steady state inﬂation compared to the quite large impact on the
debt to GDP ratio.
The stochastic simulation results show that under central bank commit-
ment, output persistence increases compared to the discretionary case. The
result is derived using the timeless perspective approach to precommitment by
Woodford (1999). Under the timeless perspective, inﬂation and output per-
sistence reﬂects the economic data. The ﬁscal policy is also compatible with
the optimal monetary policy from timeless a perspective and the result holds
also with alternative ﬁscal policy rules. The ﬁscal policy parameter and the
target values do not aﬀect the persistence of inﬂation and output. However,
the variability of output increases compared to the discretionary case.
With the deﬁcit rules, the autocorrelation of the tax rate is near unity
irrespective of the monetary policy regime, and irrespective of the ﬁscal policy
parameters and targets. Thus we revive Barro’s (1979) random walk result
with the deﬁcit rules. With the debt rules and the high debt to GDP target
values, the Barro result does not hold and the tax rate inherits the stochastic
nature of underlying shocks. With the error-correction type of ﬁscal policy
rule, the tax rate changes are smooth as the autocorrelation is near unity with
all combinations of the ﬁscal policy parameter and the deﬁcit to GDP target
values.
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21A Appendix A: Potential output without distor-
tionary taxes
Let’s rewrite the household’s budget constraint with lump sum taxation
ct + mt − (1 − πt)mt−1 + bt ≤ (1 + rt−1)bt−1 + wtlt − Tt, (44)
where Tt is lump sum taxes. Now the household’s utility maximisation using
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¢λ the real marginal cost is
cσ
t yλ
t A−(1+λ) = mct. (47)
In order to log-linearise (47), ﬁrst substitute in the process for technological
progress A = ζteα∗Time and take natural logarithms. Use the deﬁnition b xt =
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b gt − (1 + λ)b ζt = c mct. (48)














t is the level of ﬂexible price output, which is the desired level of









κ zt.12 As we can see
from (21) and (49), the long-run ﬂexible price output and the desired level of
output are both hit by the same technology shock (3)
12Note that zt ≡ lnζt.






































































































































































Table 7: Discretionary monetary policy with the debt rule
Note: corr. is the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient.






































































































































































Table 8: Discretionary monetary policy with the deﬁcit rule
Note: corr. is the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient.






































































































































































Table 9: Discretionary monetary policy with the error-correction deﬁcit rule
Note: corr. is the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient.






































































































































































Table 10: Committed monetary policy with the debt rule
Note: corr. is the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient.






































































































































































Table 11: Committed monetary policy with the error-correction deﬁcit rule
Note: corr. is the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient.
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